Legitimacy at a crossroads: are the European Parliament elections key for future EU social policy ambitions?

João Magalhães – PhD in Social Policy, University of Edinburgh

In 2024, a new political cycle in the European Parliament (EP) will take place and European Union’s (EU) citizens are called to cast their vote in what might be decisive in shaping a new political configuration. Considering the ongoing construction of a European Social Union, will the new EP political landscape strengthen its influence in safeguarding social rights?

Projections made for the EP elections point to a new distribution of seats, with an increase in the right-wing parties (Figure 1). This political constellation might influence not only the tendency of the classic left-right disputes based on national welfare preferences, but also the powers and scope of the EU. However, ultimately, it will depend on the EP capacity to strongly shape secondary legislation, resources redistribution and coordination vis a vis a solely technocratic and intergovernmental exercise.

Author’s design. Source: Europe Elects

What to expect in the EU social realm from the new EP’s configuration?

It has been argued  that electoral rules have an impact on redistributive social resources considering the left- and right-wing political cleavages. This explanation, grounded in the power-resources theory, supports the EP’s multi-party system in promoting welfare development. Although the EU has residual redistributive power (1% of the EU GDP), as well as the EP electoral rules tend to reflect a national voting behaviour rather than a supranational one, the decision-making processes continues to be based on “grand coalitions”.

But will this change? Since 1999, there has been a clear shift to the right, by a loosing of space for social democracy and an exponential growth of nationalist voices, as “recent national elections (…) and currents polls showed voters rewarding parties that champion hardline limits on asylum seekers and promote industry over climate”. In addition, as Amandine Crespy states, “[u]nlike their predecessors from the pro-European Christian democracy, significant sections within the Conservatives of the [EPP] have been hostile to an agenda seeking to deepen social policy integration at the EU level and are less prone to compromise”. Taking this into consideration, Table 1 shows the projected seats, by welfare regime classification, adapted to the contemporary EU member-states.

Table 1. Projected seats distribution for the 2024 elections, by welfare regime classification

 

Welfare regimes	Sum of number of seats	% of total (720 seats in 2024)*	EU Member-states
Social democratic	51	7,1	Denmark, Sweden and Finland
Conservative	256	35,6	Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg
Liberal	14	1,9	Ireland
Mediterranean	179	24,5	Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece
New member states	220	30,6	Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romenia, Estona, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus, Poland and Czech Republic

Source: “Social Policy in The European Union”, Karen M. Anderson; The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, Gøsta Esping-Andersen; *European Parliament Press Release (13/09/2023)

Despite the political trends, the conservative welfare states might continue to hold more than a third of EP representation and, on top of a normative line of conflict based on national sovereignty, a territorial line from the Mediterranean and Eastern states might continue pressing for more solidarity. Ultimately, it might lead to less consensus or “the emergence of new political coalitions”.

In practice, what powers does the EP hold to shape the European social model?

The treaties define the rules and since the EU conception, major changes gave the EP a more prominent role in three social policy-making areas. First, EP’s role as co-legislator gives an important democratic mandate, by reaching consensus to “respond to national divisions with European political strength and unity”, as rapporteur Morin-Chartier stated. Even in non-binding legislation, as is the European Pillar of Social Rights, the EP can vote on resolutions calling for concrete binding actions.

Second, regarding the European Social Fund (ESF) not only the EP considers one of the most important EU tools in promoting social policy, as actively behaves as socio-political activist. Indeed, in the most recent ESF negotiation for the 2021- 2027 period, a change of the expression of “poverty reduction” to “poverty eradication” was amended, underlining the higher level of commitment of the EP to the EU citizens.

However, in the third area of coordination through the European Semester, the EP engagement is still largely marginalized. Although it has been carved out a place for itself, the absence of parliamentary legitimation and of democratic debate continues to be a key feature. Following the inclusion of the NextGenerationEU, it also implies collective redistributive choices with a major impact on welfare states. These mechanisms encroach massively on the powers of the EP to control the EU expenditure, hence undermining the idea that there should be “no taxation without parliamentary representation”. Again, the lack of EP representation carries legitimacy deficits.

Conclusion

The European social model requires continuous efforts to link national welfare preferences to supranational competences in a democratic way, where the EP’s role of citizens direct representation can support legitimation. However, on one side, as the EP elections happens in a critical moment, the new plenary configuration can be a turning point for consensus-building and, on the other, although EP’s mandate and powers in the social field have come a long way, still needs to counterbalance the current technocratic processes. As so, the EP can deliver on its promises, if there are more democratic intersections in the social-making processes.